

# The Temporal Dimension of the Credibility of EU Conditionality and Candidate States' Compliance with the *acquis communautaire*, 1998-2009 – Web Appendix

## Basic information of variables

**Web Appendix Table** Basic information of variables.

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	VIF
Degree of compliance (log)	101	0.44	0.22	-0.11	0.80	
Probability of EU accession	101	0.51	0.25	0.00	1.00	2.54
Time	101	2002	3.08	1998	2009	2.46
Political liberalisation	101	8.93	1.06	6	10	2.36
Economic liberalisation	98	60.67	6.99	45.7	77.7	2.49
Pro-enlargement presidency	101	0.71	0.45	0	1	1.21
Political constraints	101	0.46	0.08	0.27	0.67	1.74
GDP <i>per capita</i> (log)	101	8.49	0.62	7.10	9.67	4.21
Government expenditures (log)	101	22.25	1.30	19.91	25.26	1.66
Government position	92	14.26	3.75	6.17	19.80	1.75
Bureaucratic strength	101	0.38	0.48	-0.94	1.35	7.90

The table above summarises the basic information of all variables presented in the manuscript. The variation inflation factors (VIFs) demonstrate that the explanatory factors do not largely suffer from multicollinearity. In other words – and perhaps contrary to initial expectations – there is not much overlap between, for example, *political liberalisation* and *GDP per capita (log)*. An exception is *bureaucratic strength*, however, since its VIF is well above the threshold level of 5. We therefore run additional models in the paper that omit this item.

## Robustness

In order to ensure the robustness of our findings, we changed a variety of model specifications and ran the estimates again.<sup>1</sup> First, we altered the operationalisation of the *probability of EU accession* and employed an even more conservative setup. In more detail,

we assigned the probability of 0 if a country has not (yet) been granted the status as official candidate, the probability of 0.25 if a country has been granted the status of official candidate, and the probability of 1 if a country has signed the accession treaty. Thus, we discarded the probabilities of 0.5 and 0.75 entirely. The estimations using this alternative specification did not affect the substance of the findings, however.

Second, Turkey might appear somewhat as an outlier as it constitutes a special case due to its comparably long and difficult process of membership negotiations. Thus, estimating membership probabilities from its accession process according to our coding rationale is unlikely to work. We therefore excluded Turkey from all analyses in the paper, but since the results do not change significantly when dropping this state, we report the findings regarding Turkey there.

Third, unreported models also contain year fixed effects to control for exogenous system-wide shocks common to all countries in our data. The findings reveal only minor differences with regard to our control variables, while the core finding of a curvilinear relationship between *probability of EU accession* and *degree of compliance (log)* remains robust.

Finally, we estimated models using three-stage least squares regression (3SLS) for determining if our results might suffer from simultaneity bias, i.e., reverse causality (see Toshkov, 2008: 382).<sup>2</sup> This might particularly apply, since our dependent variable is based on the Commission's reports. With the probability of membership increasing, the Commission could become less critical precisely because it would be (politically) too costly to hold the process (see also Hille and Knill, 2006: 546; Toshkov, 2008: 382). Hence, 3SLS is an obvious choice to re-estimate our models given the structure of the data. To this end, we calculated the smooth terms from above manually and then specified equations for these two items. In our case, the endogenous variables are *degree of compliance (log)* and the two manually computed components of the smooth terms for *probability of EU accession*. While the results are generally similar to Table 2 of our article, it is in particular interesting that the

first component of the smooth terms of *probability of EU accession* is positively signed, while the second one has a negative impact. These signs are in line with a curvilinear relationship to *degree of compliance (log)*, while both effects are also significant at the 1% level. In the associated equations for these two smooth terms, however, our dependent variable is in fact positively signed and significant. Although this supports the view that causality flows from EU membership conditionality to compliance with EU law and the other way round, our findings for the two smooth term are consistent with our calculations in Table 2 of the article. In other words, the core result that candidates seeking membership have strong incentives to comply with EU law before accession, but this incentive substantially decreases at (or shortly before) accession, is robust across many different model specifications and the substance of this result is, accordingly, not changed.